with aprapam
This article has been written in collaboration with the Association for the responsibilisation of maritime artisanal fisheries stakeholders (Association pour la responsibilisation des acteurs de la pêche artisanale maritime, APRAPAM).
Note: An update was made on 3 July 2024 to include mention of the decree on participatory surveillance in Senegal.
On 27 May 2024, in a press release, the European Commission announced that it had pre-identified Senegal as a non-cooperating country in the fight against IUU fishing "due to several years of shortcomings and lack of cooperation".
In recent years, serious shortcomings have been identified "in the system put in place by the country to comply with its international obligations as a flag State, port State, coastal State or market State". The press release also states that the shortcomings in terms of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance "concern vessels flying the Senegalese flag and operating in waters outside the country's jurisdiction, as well as controls carried out on foreign fishing vessels in the port of Dakar".
1.What is the EU’s concern about Senegal’s efforts to combat IUU fishing?
More detailed information on these shortcomings can be found in the evaluation of the fisheries agreement between the EU and Senegal, recently published: "Since 2020, the EU has asked Senegal numerous questions at the annual meetings of ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas) concerning the control of the Senegalese fleet operating in the ICCAT area and the controls implemented at the port of Dakar [...]. In 2021, 2022 and again in 2023, the EU has identified exports from Senegal to the European market in excess of the quotas allocated to Senegal by ICCAT".
On this last point, in a note shared by the European Union with the ICCAT Compliance Committee in November 2021, it is noted that Senegal, which had a quota of 225 tons of North Atlantic swordfish for 2020, only declared having caught 10 tons of swordfish that year. But "checks carried out on imports into the EU show that in 2020 Senegal validated the export of 311 tons of this swordfish by a single vessel", i.e. 30 times more than the catches declared.
In the same note, the EU also raises the case of a series of vessels that have been identified for illegal fishing under the Senegalese flag - vessels that can be found on ICCAT's IUU list. These high-risk vessels have used the Senegalese flag, as well as other flags often accused of complacency, to evade the rules. For example, the MAXIMUS, which has been involved in IUU fishing, was successively flagged in Belize, Vanuatu, Mongolia and St Vincent and the Grenadines, was then "Senegalised" in 2019, before flying the flag of Gambia under a new name, the LUCAS.
According to the recently published list of vessels authorised to fish by Senegal, there are currently eight tuna vessels flying the Senegalese flag, including five purse seiners managed by the company CAPSEN, representing the interests of the Korean company DONG WON: the GRANADA, the ORIENTAL KIM, the WESTERN KIM, the XIXILI and the CAP ATLANTIQUE.
Based on the information available, the pre-identification of Senegal as a non-cooperating country in the fight against IUU fishing, the "yellow card", does not imply that these tuna vessels have recently been involved in IUU fishing operations under the Senegalese flag. However, it should be noted that DONG WON has been linked to IUU fishing activities in the past, like, in 2013, when the company was fined by Liberia for fishing without a license and failing to declare catches, or more recently, in a 2019 report entitled "Do you IUU?".
The European Union also points to shortcomings in controls at the port of Dakar. Given the importance of this port in the region, "this is a major concern".
The evaluation of the fisheries agreement also stresses this point, citing a 2023 report by the NGO EJF on possible IUU activities by eight Chinese vessels operating in the ICCAT area, such as shark finning, fishing in prohibited areas and catching protected species: "Some of these vessels have been located on several occasions at the Port of Dakar, where they have sometimes even landed their catches". A few years ago, in 2016, Italian vessels involved in illegal fishing operations in Gambia were located in the port of Dakar.
2. IUU fishing that affects coastal communities is the one that takes place in the coastal zone
The shortcomings of Senegal highlighted by the EU mainly concern tuna fishing operations in the ICCAT area. It should be remembered, however, that for artisanal fishing communities, illegal fishing activities in the coastal zones of Senegal and the region are the main concern.
The evaluation of the EU-Senegal fisheries agreement agrees, pointing out that, despite the efforts made by Senegal in recent years, the level of fisheries control and surveillance of the country's waters is not sufficient: "The result is a large number of IUU fishing activities carried out by both industrial fishing (national and foreign) and small-scale fishing. Despite the adoption of a new law, the development of a National Action Plan to combat IUU fishing, adopted in 2015 and updated in 2023 for the period 2023-2028, and the acquisition of operational resources, IUU fishing activities persist". The assessment continues: "This situation is all the more worrying as coastal demersal stocks (deep-sea fish) with a high market value (mainly exported) remain fully exploited, or even overexploited. In addition, fishing pressure on species consumed locally (small pelagics) is increasing due to the growing export of these species, with a serious risk of supply shortages on the local market".
One of the causes of this situation, denounced by small-scale fishers and civil society, is the proliferation of fake joint ventures. "Under the guise of these joint ventures, Senegal's industrial fishing industry is in the hands of foreign interests that do not respect our regulations", commented recently Gaoussou Gueye, President of CAOPA.
Following the publication by the new Minister for Fisheries of the list of boats that have received authorisation, it has been noted that many "Senegalese" boats are of Chinese origin. In 2020, the APRAPAM association denounced the fact that certain Chinese boats, in the process of receiving a fishing permit and being "senegalised", had a history of IUU fishing, such as the RUISHUN boats, which had previously been expelled from Madagascar for illegal fishing in coastal areas. Greenpeace, for its part, already denounced in 2017 the granting of fishing authorisations by Senegal to Chinese boats from the FU YUAN YU group that had fished in protected areas in Djibouti.
As Gaoussou Gueye points out, "some of these trawlers do not hesitate to hide behind the Senegalese flag to take advantage of the fishing protocols negotiated by Senegal with Guinea-Bissau and Liberia in particular. They take advantage of the fishing resources of these countries, often without respecting their legislation, at the risk of tarnishing relations between Senegal and its neighbours". This is the case of the trawlers belonging to the company Soperka, of Spanish origin, which have decimated deep-water shrimp resources in Liberia under the guise of scientific fishing, without providing any data that could be used by the country's scientists.
3. Non-compliance with the rules by European vessels operating under fishing agreements
In the context of the latest protocol to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) between the EU and Senegal, a number of problems have been raised concerning non-compliance by EU vessels with the rules laid down in the agreement.
With regard to hake fishing, for example, the evaluation of the agreement indicates that in 2019 the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) was exceeded: total catches of hake - an overexploited species - by European trawlers reached 3,052 tons, whereas the annual TAC under the Protocol was fixed at 1,750 tons. As far as we know, these catches in excess were marketed in Europe without any problems. This failure by hake trawlers to comply with the rules is totally incompatible with managing this resource in such a way as to ensure its recovery, and is a further justification for withdrawing access to hake from any future protocol to the fisheries agreement.
Another problem of compliance with the rules by vessels under agreement made the headlines when four Spanish pole-and-line tuna vessels were arrested in June 2020 for collecting live bait in the prohibited zone of Hann Bay, with fines of FCFA 20 million per vessel.
The joint scientific committee of 2023 detailed this problem. According to the report, all EU pole and line vessels have been based, and land their catches, in the port of Dakar since the 1980s. Traditionally, Senegalese pirogues fish for bait in Hann Bay for these boats, which pay them for live bait catches before each fishing trip. Since 2020, Hann Bay, defined as a spawning area, has become a special protection zone, where it is no longer possible for industrial vessels to enter or to fish. As a result, pole and line vessels (both European and Senegalese) have to wait outside the bay to load the bait that the pirogues bring them from inside the bay. The new situation means that the pirogues have to tow their full nets from their fishing area outside the Bay, an average distance of around two nautical miles. During this transfer, the bait in the net suffers extensive damage and can no longer be delivered alive; dead bait fish are discarded.
In 2020, one of the four sanctioned pole and line vessel, the AITA FRAXKU, initially failed to pay the fine, with repercussions for the entire fleet under the fishing agreement: until early 2022, Senegal refused to grant licences to 26 European vessels fishing under agreement, until the fine was paid. Subsequently, a "temporary special permit" was granted by the Spanish authorities to this fleet of pole and line vessels based in Dakar, to get live bait in the Canary Islands fishing zone, and to fish for tuna "in international waters". This led to tensions with the Canary Islands artisanal fishermen.
4. EU support for Senegal in the fight against IUU fishing did not produce the expected results
Senegal has received significant support in its fight against IUU fishing, both as part of the sectoral support provided by the SFPA and, as part of the regional PESCAO project. The SFPA evaluation states that "as part of the PESCAO project, Senegal took part in 9 regional and national training courses on combating IUU fishing, strengthening MCS measures and the EU catch certification scheme. These training courses were attended by fisheries inspectors and prosecutors responsible for enforcing maritime legislation. Through the support provided by the European Fisheries Control Agency (EFCA) to the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Senegal has also "benefited from patrol operations at sea, including aerial surveillance. Following studies on the legal frameworks of the countries in the region covered by the PESCAO, Senegal requested support to revise its National Plan to combat IUU fishing, but this was not achieved.
However, the evaluation points out that despite these efforts, and the development of a National Action Plan to combat IUU fishing, updated in 2023, "the phenomenon of IUU fishing has increased in recent years: The lack of visibility in the operation and ineffectiveness of political management bodies are noteworthy". What's more, "there is still no effective system for monitoring fishing activities throughout Senegal's EEZ to implement existing legislative and regulatory provisions and thus combat IUU fishing. The legal reform begun several years ago, but has still not resulted in the adoption of a new framework law to modernise the legal framework for fisheries".
To explain these mixed results, APRAPAM and other local civil society organisations point to a lack of transparency and accountability on the part of the authorities, which leaves the door open to corrupt practices.
5. Why a yellow card now?
According to the EU, since 2019 it has been asking Senegal questions about its action to counter IUU fishing in the ICCAT area. The EU has reportedly received no response. So what is the justification for issuing a yellow card now, when, on the other hand, negotiations are under way for the renewal of the SFPA protocol between the two countries?
“We do not believe it is appropriate to negotiate a tuna agreement with a partner country that has been pre-notified as a non-cooperating state in the fight against IUU fishing, as long as the dialogue has not begun to bear fruit.””
The change of government appears to be a key factor in triggering Senegal's pre-notification procedure. In its press release, the European Commission "recognises the measures recently taken by the new government (namely the publication of the list of fishing licences and the audit of the fishing fleet) and is reassured by this fact...". The European Commission seems to be of the opinion that with the new authorities, there is a better chance of making progress together in the fight against IUU fishing.
By pre-notifying Senegal, the Commission is initiating a formal dialogue with the country. This decision does not entail any trade measures. However, as the Commission points out, "in the event of prolonged and continuous non-compliance, the country may ultimately be subject to an identification procedure ("red card"), which entails a ban on exporting fishery products to the EU market".
It is to be hoped that dialogue will enable Senegal to combat IUU fishing more effectively. An export ban would unfairly penalise Senegal's small-scale fishing industry, which exports a large proportion of its products to the lucrative European market. It is also to be hoped, for the benefit of local fishing communities, that the dialogue will not be limited to issues relating to IUU operations in tuna fisheries, and will address the problems caused by vessels engaged in illegal fishing in coastal areas, where they cause significant negative impacts for artisanal fishing.
One of the demands of small-scale fishing is to combat incursions into coastal areas by vessels using destructive gear, such as coastal trawlers. Participatory surveillance has been promoted for several decades in Africa, but it has not been legally defined in most countries and generally lacks administrative, logistical and financial support. Among the problems reported by fishers involved in this surveillance are the lack of boats, the fact that fishermen have to provide their own fuel for surveillance trips, and the frequent lack of response from the authorities when it comes to enforcing regulations on boats identified by artisanal fishermen as being involved in IUU fishing. This means that artisanal fishermen who try to defend their local fisheries do so at their own expense and at considerable risk, often with no guarantee that the authorities will actually catch the offenders.
For the system to work, artisanal fishermen must be provided with adequate equipment, enabling them to inform the authorities directly of suspicious activities, and the respective roles and responsibilities of fishermen and the authorities must be clearly defined.
[Ed. (updated on 3 July 2024): A decree of September 2023 detailed the procedures for implementing participatory surveillance, a subject which remains a priority for the new government].
As far as the negotiations on the fisheries agreement, it does not seem appropriate to negotiate a tuna agreement with a partner country that has been pre-notified as a non-cooperating state in the fight against IUU fishing, as long as the dialogue has not begun to bear fruit.
On this point, given that some boats of European origin, fishing under joint ventures or even under the fisheries agreement, do not comply with the rules, the European Union has a responsibility that it must recognise as part of this dialogue with Senegal: that of better controlling boats of European origin, and that of severely penalising them when they do not comply with the rules.
Banner photo: The artisanal fisheries landing site of Fass Boye, in Senegal, by Agence Mediaprod.
SOPERKA, a Senegalese fishing company, in a joint venture with the Spanish company Grupo Pereira, wished to react to our article “Experimental fishing or experimental pillaging in Liberia?” Mr Kandji, Managing Director, Mr Serrano, from the company Pereira, adviser to SOPERKA for its fishing operations, and Mr Perez Bouzada, a lawyer, who defends the interests of the company Pereira, expressed their views on a series of issues raised in the article.