July 2022. A comprehensive assessment of the fish resources in Liberian waters is about to start.
By evaluating the quantity and commercial value of fish resources, mapping out the fishing grounds and the biodiversity hotspots, the research will ascertain the commercial viability of the fishing sector.
To undertake this activity, Liberia, through the National Fisheries and Aquaculture Authority NaFAA, signed an agreement with Senegal Oceanographic Research Institute (CRODT). To be sponsored by the World Bank, as part of their Liberia Sustainable Management of Fisheries project worth 40 million euros, this research campaign will take advantage of the CRODT research vessel, the ITAF DEME, launched in 2021 with the EU-Senegal Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) sectoral support.
The research campaign is to be conducted twice a year over a period of five years, and the scientific information collected will inform the decision on reopening a viable commercial fishing sector in Liberia, and attracting further investment in fish processing facilities, for products that would both be sold on international and on local markets.
But whilst researchers get ready to examine the state of Liberia fisheries resources, a 40-meters long bottom trawler, the KANBAL III, flagged in Senegal, belonging to the Spanish company Grupo Pereira which is represented in Senegal by the company Soperka, continues to plunder deep sea resources along the 6-mile limit of Liberian waters, following the edge of the continental shelf. Its trawl scrapes the bottom of the sea at a depth of 400 to 600 meters, in a fragile environment composed of soft corals and sponges which, once destroyed, will take forever to recover. This ‘biodiversity hotspot’ may be lost before it is even properly examined by the researchers.
An alarming number of oddities surrounding the fishing authorisations
Strangely, since the beginning of 2022, the KANBAL III, like its sister vessels EL AMINE and SOKONE (currently fishing in Senegal), is not on the NaFAA list of licenced fishing vessels anymore. They now have a license as ‘support vessels’. By definition, a support vessel is “any vessel used, or intended for use, in any operation at sea in support of, or in preparation for, any fishing activity, including support ships, carrier vessels and any other vessel engaged in support operations such as bunkering and transhipment.” A support vessel does not fish. Yet, KANBAL III does… It targets the highly prized Liberia deep water shrimps, called ‘carabineros’, which sell at up to 145 euros per kg on the international market.
Describing a 40 meters long bottom trawler as a ‘support vessel’ only adds to the list of oddities concerning the activities of these vessels in Liberia. Indeed, in 2021, the Soperka vessels received an experimental fishing authorisation to fish in Liberia under the Senegal-Liberia bilateral agreement, but CFFA reported that the operations of the vessels did not fulfil the conditions stipulated in the national fisheries law, and highlighted both the unsustainability of their fishing, and the loss of earnings for Liberia.
In response to a Liberian journalist question following our report, in October 2021, the NaFAA representative insisted these vessels activities posed “absolutely no threat to the marine ecosystem nor threaten coastal livelihood,” as the declared catches “amounted to only 142 tons of shrimps” in the last six months.
Since this first CFFA report in 2021, Global Fishing Watch monitored 7000 fishing hours by these vessels in Liberian waters. With a conservative estimation of a 35 Kgs of prawn per hour catch rate, the retail value of the prawns caught, ultimately benefitting the Spanish company Grupo Pereira, could have reached up to 35 million euros, which should have brought in Liberia a sizeable sum, as the exploratory fishing authorisation states that 10% of the ex-vessel value, - more or less 30% of the retail value-, of the catch is due to Liberia.
In the 2021 news interview, the NaFAA representative also answered concerns on the deployment of scientific observers, explaining that “each fishing vessel shall have at least one scientific observer”, adding that NaFAA also has fisheries inspectors deployed at each landing sites to monitor every landing. Unfortunately, none of these vessels has ever entered Monrovia port since the operation began in May 2021. Landings have been mostly done in the port of Dakar (Senegal), and observers on board are being embarked and disembarked there as well. NaFAA has not issued any report of the observations. Without solid catch data, values of the catches cannot be estimated… and how much Liberia is losing remains hidden.
Too late for the carabineros?
There is little doubt that the research campaign, by the Senegal Research Institute CRODT in Liberia, is a welcome initiative. It will boost regional research cooperation, provide vital data to Liberia for managing its fisheries sustainably, and help CRODT maintain its only research vessel. This is the type of initiative that should be supported throughout Africa, including as part of the SFPA sectoral support.
However, the unbridled exploitation of Liberia deep sea shrimp, the ‘carabineros’, and the destruction of a fragile tropical coastal environment by vessels of EU origin reflagged to Senegal under the guise of joint-venture, with multi-million euros benefits accruing to a Spanish company, flies in the face of sustainability.
It highlights, again, the need for the EU and its African partner countries to ensure that all the fishing activities in African waters that benefits EU companies and nationals are subjected, by coastal states like Liberia, by flag states like Senegal, and by market states and states of beneficial ownership, like Spain, to the same rules for ensuring sustainability. For the ‘carabineros’, alas, it may be too late.
Banner photo: Illustrative picture of a vessel similar to Kanbal III, by Fer Nando/Unsplash.
With Senegal’s yellow card, fisheries agreement negotiations between the EU and Senegal are at a standstill. Meanwhile, the EU will negotiate the renewal of its SFPA with The Gambia, whose waters are bordered on both sides by Senegal’s. How would access to the Gambian waters be used by EU fleets, at a time when they may be barred from Senegal waters?