In this article, the author raises a series of questions regarding access, transparency and sectoral support, which need to be taken into account prior to the renewal of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) between the EU and The Gambia. The author also looks at regional developments: With Senegal’s yellow card, fisheries agreement negotiations between the EU and Senegal are at a standstill. How would access to the Gambian waters be used by EU fleets, at a time when they may be barred from Senegal waters?
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A year before the expiration of the EU-The Gambia protocol and fishing agreement, the Commission launched an open call for evidence for its re-negotiation mandate.

Due to expire in June 2025, it gives access to The Gambian waters, a mere 80 km of coast, the shortest coastline in Africa and the smallest EEZ, to 38 tuna vessels and 3 black hake trawlers. Together with the EU-Senegal Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA), this allowed for continued fishing in the region, as the Senegalese waters surround The Gambia.

1. Questions on access

A) WOULD THE NEW PROTOCOL BE A BACK DOOR TO SENEGALESE WATERS FOR EU VESSELS?

End of May 2024, the Commission pre-identified Senegal, The Gambia’s only neighbour, as a non-cooperating country in the fight against IUU fishing. The press release talked of serious shortcomings “in the system put in place by the country to comply with its international obligations” as a flag, port, coastal and market State, as well as deficiencies in terms of Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS). With this pre-notification, commonly known as yellow card, the EU informed of its intention to start a formal dialogue on IUU with Senegal. Therefore, the Commission will not for the present start negotiations to renew the (mainly) tuna fishing agreement with Senegal – its protocol is due to expire in November 2024.

In this context, the renewal of the SFPA with The Gambia raises a question: under the current protocol, 38 tuna vessels can use fishing possibilities and come in The Gambia waters, which has a coastline of 80 km and an Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) 14% the size of its neighbour’s.

#1

Does it make sense, from an economic point of view, for such a high number of vessels to have fishing possibilities in The Gambia when they will not be allowed to cross the boundaries with Senegal?

B) HAS THE GAMBIA’S EEZ BEEN CLEARLY ESTABLISHED?

Whereas the delimitation between The Gambia’s and Senegal’s waters has been established through a treaty between the two countries, The Gambian Fisheries Act of 2007 is not at all clear regarding its fishing zones. Its definitions of the different maritime spaces do not comply with UNCLOS. For example, it defines the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as the “distance of two hundred nautical miles long into the ocean within the jurisdiction of a coastal State,” whereas UNCLOS stipulates that it is “is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, […] under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention” (Article 55). The EEZ “shall not extend beyond 200 miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured” (Article 57). In a study on The Gambia’s artisanal fishing zone, the author also raised several questions regarding the lack of clarity of the Gambian legislation and the subsequent amendments that have been done in 2008 and 2019.

The EU-The Gambia SFPA mentions “the Gambian fishing zone” and defines it as “the part of the waters under the sovereignty or jurisdiction of The Gambia where The Gambia authorises Union vessels to engage in fishing activities” (Article 1(i)). The Annex further stipulates that the "Gambian authorities shall notify” the EU “of the geographical coordinates of the Gambian baseline, the Gambian fishing zone and zones closed to shipping and fishing” (§3).

#2

The question that arises is whether the waters where EU vessels would be authorised to fish as part of an EU-Gambia agreement have been clearly established?

C) SHOULD THE EU CONTINUE TO ACCESS BLACK HAKE OVEREXPLOITED STOCKS?

Even though the EU-Senegal and the EU-The Gambia SFPAs are mainly tuna agreements, 2 and 3 EU trawlers respectively had access to black hake. Black hake is a demersal species that The Gambia shares with Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco. There is no fishery body managing these shared species, yet there is a scientific committee assessing the state of stocks, the Fishery Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic (CECAF). The demersal species working group – North met in June 2022, indicated yet again that the resources are overexploited and recommended a “significant reduction in fishing effort and a reduction in catch to reach a sustainable catch level (MSY).”

The EU fleets, operating under SFPAs, contribute to the overexploitation of hake in the region. In Mauritania, the EU vessels’ “by-catches of hake by other demersal and pelagic fishing vessels are reaching or even exceeding the targeted catches of hake.” In fact, the CECAF demersal working group noted in its report to CECAF in December 2022 that “given the importance of by-catches (2021= 5 700 tonnes), the working group recommends that the necessary measures be taken to reduce by-catches from other fisheries (particularly pelagic) to the level of the period 2002-2014 (about 900 tons).” In Senegal, European trawlers far exceeded – almost doubled- the total allowable catch (TAC) in 2019, according to the evaluation. As CFFA already highlighted, “as far as we know, these catches in excess were marketed in Europe without any problems.”

Regarding access to hake under the EU-The Gambia SFPA more specifically, the ex-ante evaluation of 2018 identified, as a possible scenario for an SFPA, a tuna agreement with a limited demersal component “for two demersal trawlers targeting black hake, which already have fishing opportunities under the Senegalese SFPA.” The evaluation further specified that the “catch levels are not sustainable” and that “authorizing EU fishing capacity in the Gambia […] could contribute to increase fishing effort unless it was specified that the same two vessels operating in Senegal” would receive those fishing opportunities “under strict conditionalities.” This has not happened. In fact, looking at the EU fishing authorisations database, we can see that different Spanish trawlers requested authorisations for Senegal and for The Gambia.

Another argument of the evaluation for keeping hake under the fishing agreement was that the EU could bring an “added value” to “improve the management of the sub-regional stock of black hake” (p. 89). As we already contended when commenting on the Senegal SFPA, “the argument that access to an overexploited species provides a lever for the EU to promote its sustainable management is irrelevant. Within the framework of a partnership for sustainable fisheries, the EU has every opportunity to raise issues concerning resources to which it does not have access.”

Beyond the issue of hake overexploitation, the black hake trawl fishery also produces considerable levels of high value bycatches, such as different species of shrimps and cephalopods, which are species also caught by artisanal fishers. The EU hake trawl fishery therefore competes with artisanal fishers, as its vessels operate in areas close to the coast. In such areas, there is an additional risk of collisions and damage to artisanal fishers’ gears.

#3

With the scientific assessments confirming for several years that hake is overexploited in the region, and considering the competition with local artisanal fishers, there is no reason to retain access to hake in a future SFPA protocol. The EU must also continue supporting the regional collection of scientific data for hake.

D) WHERE ARE WE AT FOR THE REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF SMALL PELAGICS?

Fisheries resources are the main source of protein for most Gambians, “bonga” (ethmalosa) being the staple food, caught by artisanal fisheries. National per capita fish consumption is estimated at 25 kg/year in coastal areas. Bonga is also targeted by industrial vessels and some artisanal pirogues which are providing raw material for the 3 fishmeal factories in the country. These factories, located in Gunjur, Sanyang and Kartong, have created havoc in the Gambian fishing communities. They particularly compete with women for access to small pelagics, depriving them of fish to process. There are also impacts on the number of fishers which appears to be declining in the last two decades. Despite the mobilisation of fishing communities, local civil society, and international NGOs, there has been no change or action taken to improve the situation of fishing communities or their access to fish in the country.

The small pelagics working group of CECAF considers ethmalosa to be overexploited. To restore bonga to a reasonable level of exploitation, it recommended a reduction of catches “below 2020 levels” (the year of the data of the report, see p. 11). European fleets have not had access to small pelagics in The Gambia. However, as the European Parliament pointed out in its last term, the Commission has sufficient leverage through its partnerships in the region to encourage joint management of fisheries resources, such as the setting up a Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (RFMO) for stocks shared by the countries in the region. The latest news is that the Commission was still betting on transforming CECAF into an RFMO. But this would be a cumbersome undertaking for political reasons and it is an undertaking that seems to be making little headway...

#4

The EU should continue to support the scientific and technical work that CECAF is carrying out, and supporting the collection of data and sampling through the sectoral support of its SFPAs in the region. However, it must also commit politically and technically to support regional management of small pelagics.

2. Questions on transparency

A) WHAT IS THE TOTAL FISHING EFFORT?

Most SFPA contain a transparency clause which require the third country to share and/or publish information about the other foreign agreements concluded. However, as it was highlighted in the recently published report on SFPAs, “partner third countries publishing the foreign agreements concluded remain an exception.” The Gambia is not an exception.

Further to that, information about the vessels authorised to fish in The Gambia waters is not available. Several informal sources cite around 60 industrial vessels, whether foreign or nationalised. CFFA is aware of at least one presumed case of an Italian trawler reflagged to The Gambia (see section below for more information). Local fisheries stakeholders denounce the opacity around the total fishing effort as well as the recurrent illegal incursions of trawlers into areas that are reserved to small-scale fisheries.

To ensure the overall fishing effort is known and to efficiently deter IUU fishing in Gambian waters, transparency is essential. Mauritania and Senegal have taken steps to increase the transparency in fisheries, Mauritania by committing to the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI), and Senegal by publishing the list of its licensed vessels. The African confederation of artisanal fisheries organisations (CAOPA) has called African countries to follow suit and apply FiTI standards. This means that The Gambia should publish up-to-date lists of licenced vessels, the list of infringements, and effectively enforce laws and apply fines to those not respecting them.

Furthermore, the current EU-The Gambia SFPA supports “Participatory monitoring in the fight against IUU fishing” (section 3 on control and inspection), which calls on EU vessels to report the presence of any vessels in the Gambian fishing zone engaged in activities which may constitute IUU fishing. If the list of licensed vessels was made public, Gambian artisanal fishers could also help in this task and identify which industrial trawlers are engaged in activities which may constitute IUU fishing in the Gambian fishing zone.

#5

In any new protocol between the EU and The Gambia, it will be essential that the transparency clause is effectively applied. Stakeholders, in particular representatives of the artisanal fisheries sector, should be adequately informed and consulted throughout the implementation of the agreement, including through participation in meetings of the Joint Committee.

B) WHEN WILL THE EU ACT AGAINST THE ITALIAN-OWNED VESSELS CARRYING OUT ILLEGAL OPERATIONS IN THE REGION?

Last September, the Gambian authorities arrested a vessel of Italian origin, the TWENTY, because it had not complied with the provisions of the fishing authorisation. This vessel, which was previously caught in illegal fishing operations in Sierra Leone under an Italian flag, now presumably is flagged to The Gambia. Under the exclusivity clause of the SFPA giving access to tuna and hake resources to EU vessels, this trawler fishing for shrimps could not operate in The Gambia under the flag of an EU Member State. The way to circumvent this is to reflag. However, even if they fly the flag of an African country, the fact is that the beneficial owner is still European: the beneficials of a company named Asaro and registered in Italy.

In 2019, when this vessel was still flying the Italian flag, CFFA along with 5 other organisations filed a complaint to the Commission, which ended up in a case closed with nothing done: the Commission started a pre-ligation procedure with Italy but, according to the Commission, the country provided “convincing answers” on the performance of its control system. Yet, five years on, the TWENTY resurfaces, continuing to perform illegal operations in West Africa…

#6

The EU has a responsibility as part of its dialogue with third countries in West Africa, whether under an SFPA or in the context of IUU dialogue: it should better control vessels of European origin, and ensure that Member States effectively sanction their nationals involved in IUU-fishing activities in application of Article 39 of the IUU Regulation.

C) HOW DO WE ENSURE EU INVESTMENT IS COMMENSURATE TO AVAILABLE FISHING RESOURCES?

Under its SFPAs, the EU encourages the establishment of joint fishing ventures between EU companies and local companies. Despite having a very small EEZ, and presumably an already long list of licensed vessels, The Gambia government also encourages foreign investment in its fisheries.

The problem is that there is not really a framework for these joint ventures, which frequently benefit from weak law enforcement and the lack of MCS capacities of African coastal countries. West African artisanal fishers denounce that they often compete for the resources they target and that they make incursions in the areas reserved to artisanal fisheries.

These vessels under joint ventures also profit from access to other countries through the fishing agreements negotiated between African countries, such as the Senegal-The Gambia one or the protocols of Senegal with Guinea Bissau and Liberia. This was the case of trawlers of Spanish origin belonging to the Senegalese company Soperka, which have decimated shrimp resources in Liberia. This company was authorized to fish in Liberia under an “experimental fishing” license and whereas it did operate for many days in Liberian waters, it did not provide any data that could be used by scientists.

In the current fishing agreement and protocol between Senegal and The Gambia, the two states have agreed to allocate fishing opportunities to each other for industrial vessels. They have reciprocally allocated 1300 GT for shrimp trawlers, 1300 for cephalopod trawlers, 1000 for deep demersal trawlers, 500 for the small pelagic coastal fishery and 15 tuna vessels. Most of the Senegalese and Gambian-flagged industrial vessels are of foreign origin, including Spanish-owned demersal and shrimp trawlers.

#7

Within the framework of the EU-The Gambia partnership, and more broadly, within the framework of the SFPAs with African countries, a reflection must be carried out on how to make joint ventures transparent, without having a negative impact on coastal communities or the fisheries resources and ecosystems of The Gambia or any other country in the region.

3. Questions on sectoral support

The Gambia-EU fishing agreement is a very small one: the contribution was of 550,000€ annually for 6 years. Of these, 275,000€ were “earmarked for the support of The Gambia fisheries policy in order to promote sustainability in its waters.” Clearly, it is a very small amount to spend on fisheries governance. However, transparency, participation and the information of stakeholders, even for small amounts, are essential.

The latest statistics on the local fishing sector date of 10 years ago, although in June the Government announced a “nationwide fisheries frame survey”. The figures from 2016, however, can give an idea of the importance of the sector for the Gambian economy: approximately 200,000 people depend on the fishing sector or related activities – this amounts to 10% of its population and the artisanal fishing sector employs directly and indirectly almost 30,000 people. The contribution of this sector to the countries’ GDP is approximately of 12%.

Local fishing communities have expressed their frustration at the fact that even if they are consulted about the actions to be taken, they have no feedback on the final decisions. “We do not really know what the funds have been used for,” stated a representative from the National Association of Artisanal Fisheries Operators (NAAFO).

They have been engaged, however, in one of the projects carried out as part of the co-management plan for sole fishing: the installation of marker buoys for seasonal closures. However, implementation was problematic because the anchors were too small and too light. They had apparently asked for larger, heavier ones, but these have not yet arrived. Artisanal fishing representatives would also like that this plan which dates of 2012 is put into action in a budgeted action plan by using the SFPA’s sectoral support funds.

#8

The EU must publish detailed information concerning the use of sectoral support. Beneficiaries, in particular small-scale fishing communities, must be included in identifying priorities for the use of sectoral support, as well as being involved in implementation and evaluation.

Conclusion

The European Commission has expressed its will to take better account of the regional dimension in its SFPAs with third countries. The Gambia is certainly the case of an SFPA which is deeply connected to the SFPA between the EU and Senegal. Whether it is access to black hake or the urgent need for the management of small pelagics, many of the questions raised about Gambia are also valid for its neighbour.

During the evaluation of the current agreement and protocol, and future negotiations, the EU and The Gambia will have to address these questions if they want sustainability to be at the centre of their partnership.

Banner photo: The Sanyang artisanal fisheries landing site, in The Gambia, by Agence Mediaprod.