In view of the global evaluation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements (SFPAs) that will be carried out by the Commission in 2021, the author highlights the key points which will need to be assessed from the perspective of the impacts on African coastal communities. The author also suggests essential improvements to be made for the future of SFPAs so that they better respond to the needs of these communities.
In our new paper we consider how governments manage resource rents from the blue economy. An interesting proposal is to establish a ‘commons’ fund—an independent permanent fund that invests levies from the commercial use of oceans and coastal resources, and shares the interests in these investments with all citizens via a universal cash payment.
To mark the first International day for the fight against IUU fishing, CFFA's brief paper looks critically at the concept of IUU fishing and the policy ideas on how best to fight it. We argue that popular images of IUU fishing are misleading and fail to reflect the nature of the most serious threats to coastal communities. A key aspect lies with the corrupt relationships between governments, political elites and businesses exploiting marine and coastal resources. Because of this, we argue that relying on 'criminal justice' as a solution is insufficient for coastal communities and small-scale fishers.
You can download the paper by clicking here.
The decision by the EC to impose sanctions on Comoros, and to issue warnings to Liberia, for failing to act responsibly as a flag state, is justified. However, the primary issue in this case is the fact that both countries operate open registries and have demonstrated little ability to control the fishing vessels on these. By looking at the caproate interests behind these registries, it is ambiguous whether imposing sanctions on the flag state is either effective or fair. It is important that further efforts to confront these open registries also bring into the open the hidden vested interests.
There is very little written about the role of fishing agents in Africa. Yet there are those who feel they are central to a range of problems in the sector, and work to undermine sustainable and responsible fisheries management. The problem seems to stem from systemic corruption and conflicts of interests. However, in most countries foreign fishing vessels are mandated by law to use an agent for a range of services. It is time for this situation to be reviewed, and there needs to be further debate on how the role of agents needs to be reformed, and whether some services provided by agents are in fact necessary - particularly services which should be provided by national fishing authorities.
With the growth of fishmeal production in West Africa, CFFA partners are organising a regional meeting to discuss the local impacts on food security, employment, resources and health. Here we highlight the key concerns and set out some questions to inform the meeting. Instructions are provided on how you can contribute to a online discussion that will lead up to this event. Please share your views!
On 27th April 2017, the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FiTI) was officially launched in Bali. It was the result of two years of consultations, led by an international advisory group, composed of senior government officials, representatives from both large scale and small-scale fisheries, international organisations, including the World Bank, the African Bank for Development, as well as leading fisheries NGOs. The key outcome of the launch was the ‘FiTI Standard’ that sets out how the FiTI works and what information will need to be made available by implementing countries.
At the time of the launch, at least four countries are committed to implementing the FiTI: Mauritania, the Seychelles, Indonesia and The Republic of Guinea. Governments of several other countries have also indicated an interest. The International Board of the FiTi includes people working in governments from the four implementing countries as well as Sweden, representation from international NGOs (Greenpeace, Bread for the World, Oceana, WWF). Industry representatives on the FiTI International Board have been harder to find, and so far there is only one commitment from the industrial sector, that of the Russian fishing fleet. However, what is positive is that half of the seats available for industry representatives will be reserved for the small-scale sector, and CAOPA are now confirmed as being part of the FiTI governing board, as is a representative from Traditional Fisherfolk Union of Indonesia.
That the FiTI has got this far demonstrates widespread agreement that lack of transparency has been a problem in fisheries. This has been a key point for advocacy by many NGOs working on fisheries reforms, as well as a long standing issue raised by small-scale fishing communities. Although there has been disagreement on how far transparency should go (and what constitutes commercially sensitive information), intergovernmental organisations, such as the European Commission, as well as representatives of the industrial fisheries sector are also beginning to come out in support.
At the outset the FiTI was focused on improving transparency on who has a right to fish, what is paid for that right and what is caught. However, this was considered too narrow, and a large part of the work by the international advisory group was to re-think what type of information the FiTI should include and why. As a result of this process the FiTI Standard now includes 12 reporting elements. These are thematic areas on which countries are requested to publish information. The 12 requirements are:
1. The establishment of a public registry of national fisheries laws, regulations and official policy documents.
2. The publication of a summary of laws and decrees on fisheries tenure arrangements.
3. The disclosure of all foreign fishing access agreements, as well as related studies on the environmental, social and economic impacts of these agreements.
4. The publication of national reports on the state of fish stocks.
5. The publication of an up-to-date online registry of authorised large-scale vessels, as well as information on their payments and recorded catches (aggregated for each flag state) and studies on social, economic and environmental impacts.
6. The publication of information on the small-scale sector, including the numbers of fishers, their catches and financial transfers to the state and any studies on the social and economic impacts of this sector
7. The publication of information on the post-harvest sector and fish trade.
8. The publication of information on law enforcement efforts, including a description of efforts to ensure compliance by fishers and a record of offences and protections in the sector.
9. The publication of information on labour standards in the fisheries sector and efforts to enforce these.
10. Disclosure of information on government transfers and fisheries subsidies.
11. The publication of information on official development assistance regarding public sector projects related to fisheries and marine conservation.
12. Information on the country’s status regarding beneficial ownership transparency.
At the outset it was envisaged that implementing the FiTI would involve the production of a comprehensive national report with all the information and data required to satisfy these reporting elements. Some thematic areas would be reported on each year, others every two years. Towards the end of the conceptual phase of the FiTI, it was realised the idea of countries having to produce substantial reports each year was unattractive. Not only was this considered costly, but most importantly it could undermine other efforts to compile and publish data on the fisheries sector. Now the emphasis is for governments to publish information on their own websites, not through a FiTI report. The role of the FiTi will be primarily one of verifying this public information. The ambition of the FiTI therefore is to see public authorities improve their own approach to providing credible information, rather than producing lengthy independent technical reports.
One of the early criticisms of the FiTi was that it puts a disproportionate burden on developing countries, because many have limited capacity to collect and publish information. There was a concern that this would make the FiTI unfeasible for poorer countries, including those with substantial small-scale fisheries. The FiTI Standard therefore emphasises the idea of ‘progressive improvement’. Countries are expected to publish, in an accessible way, what information they do have. In the event that they do not have certain information requested under the FiTi Standard, they are under an obligation to develop plans and timeframes to collect and publish this information. A failure to have any of the information required by the FiTI does not exclude countries from obtaining a ‘compliant status’, as long as they are being honest about the lack of their data and agree on a timeframe and plan to improve the situation.
Transparency is widely regarded as a necessary component of responsible fisheries management, and there are three main ways in which the FiTI could make a positive impact.
Firstly, the FiTI strives to reveal data that has otherwise been obscured from public scrutiny. This is perhaps what most people think of in terms of a transparency initiative. For example, in many countries information on authorised fishing vessels, access agreements and aggregated catches has been considered confidential, or at least authorities have not considered it necessary to make this information public.
Secondly, the FiTI attempts to verify if information in the public domain is reliable and complete. The FiTI requires an external assessment of information by an independent consultant, as well as further verification of the findings by a national multi-stakeholder group, composed by CSOs, industry and government representatives. As such, the FiTI is not simply aimed at lifting the lid on confidentiality, but also at providing improved credibility of data held by public authorities.
Thirdly, the FiTI is designed to reveal where public authorities simply do not collate information and it requires the national multi-stakeholder group to come to an agreement on how these gaps in knowledge will be addressed. As such, the FiTI provides the opportunity for countries to take stock of existing knowledge on the fisheries sector, and develop national plans for improvements.
These three aspects to the FiTI need to be given equal recognition. In some countries the most important contribution of the FiTI will be to highlight where data already in the public domain contains errors, and in other cases the contribution will lie in exposing and addressing the limited approaches to gathering data for publication.
The FiTi has a narrow objective of increasing the availability and credibility of fisheries information. It does not attempt to engage in any further advocacy, such as commenting on the effectiveness of fisheries management or the sustainability of fishing. Nevertheless, the FiTI has been developed so that it supports several other international fisheries governance reform efforts. This includes, for example:
By requiring national authorities to publish the most recent studies on status of fish stocks, as well as information on catches and discards, the FiTI aims to contribute to national debates on the adequacy of policies and practices to achieve sustainable fishing.
The FiTI obliges implementing countries to publish information on fisheries access agreements, including disclosing any studies on the social, economic and environmental impacts of these agreements. Such step has already been taken by the EU, and is increasingly required by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, but has been resisted by most of the other main fishing nations and coastal countries involved in fishing access agreements. For the EU, the FiTI will contribute to establishing a ‘level playing field’, while more importantly it could lead to increased national debates on the foreign fishing agreements and their wider impacts, including on small-scale fisheries and food security.
The FiTI supports international efforts to address illegal fishing and unsustainable levels of legal fishing. It requires countries to disclose detailed lists of licensed vessels, as well as information on prosecutions and resources used for law enforcement. It is widely recognised that lack of transparency has facilitated frauds and corruption in the fisheries sector. This list of licensed vessels will also further contribute to the FAO’s efforts to establish a global record of fishing vessels.
The FiTI requests information on tenure arrangements to be published, including a description of how national authorities are ensuring informal fishing rights are codified and protected. In this way the FiTI supports the implementation of the International Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure.
The FiTI requires governments to collate and publish various information on the small-scale fishing sector, including information on their social, economic and food security contributions. If this information is not available, then countries have to agree on a time frame for this information to be collated and publicised. The FiTI therefore supports the implementation of the FAO’s Guidelines on Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty Eradication .
The FiTI requests implementing countries to disclose information on national efforts to collate information on the Beneficial ownership of fishing vessels. In the short term it will not mean countries will produce complete lists of beneficial owners, but it is intended to galvanise international awareness and support for beneficial ownership transparency.
The inclusion of information on labour standards in the fisheries sector supports international efforts to abolish slavery and human trafficking , and can be used to further advocate for the promotion of the ILO Work in Fishing Convention ratification.
The request to publish information on government transfers to the fisheries sector supports international efforts, including through the WTO, to increase awareness of the scale and impact of fisheries subsidies, and is intended to stimulate national debates on the contribution of capacity enhancing subsidies to unsustainable fishing, as well as the distribution of subsidies among different fisheries sectors, such as between large scale and small-scale fisheries.
The request to collate and publish information on development projects in the fisheries sector supports international efforts to increase aid effectiveness, and compliments the International Aid Transparency Initiative.
The core assumption of the FiTI is that increasing public access to information will enhance active participation in national debates on fisheries reforms, and raise the prospect of accountability by public authorities.
A key issue is whether there is the capacity and interest, at the national level, to undertake further analysis of the information produced. The FiTI could succeed in raising public information, but the lack of interest or capacity to do anything with this information will not lead to positive changes in fisheries governance. This needs to be assessed as FiTI is implemented in different countries. The risk may be overstated, as the demand for increased transparency has been prevalent for many years, including among environmental organisations and groups working on the rights of small-scale fisheries. Nevertheless, to increase the its will require support to local groups and researchers, including journalists, to do more with data being provided by governments participating in the FiTI.
Ultimately, however, the success of the FiTI helping to achieve lasting governance reforms rests on the assumption that transparency can lead to accountability. If new information supports policy recommendations or reveals instances of abuse of powers, corruption or frauds, none of this will lead to change if public authorities or the private sector face little pressure from their citizens and from the international community to reform.
In these cases, the risk for the FiTI is that is will offer governments and companies a façade of respectability, while allowing for a continuation of business as normal. This threat is particularly prevalent in countries characterised by authoritarian governments, limited means of participation in decision making processes and low levels of individual and media freedoms.
It is therefore crucial that those engaged in the FiTI, including at the international level, promote further efforts to understand and confront forms of oppression, authoritarianism, lack of individual and media freedoms that undermine good governance of fisheries.
Two other issues will also affect whether the FiTI has lasting impacts on fisheries governance.
The FiTI Standard makes no attempt to encourage national authorities to legislate for access to information. Indeed, a criticism of other existing transparency initiatives is they treat freedom of information and participation as a voluntary gesture, rather than as a right. It would be far better if countries established laws guaranteeing citizens the right to access information and the right for participation in decision making. In the long term, this may be viewed as a stronger approach, otherwise the gains made by FiTI may be short lived, dependent on the good will of authorities and foreign fishing partners.
This limitation to the FiTI remains important, and arguably it should do more to promote access to information as a right. The European Union’s Aarhus Convention provides one of the strongest examples, and forms the basis for the UN’s Bali Guidelines on establishing laws and institutions on access to information, participation and access to justice. It was perhaps a missed opportunity not to link the Bali Guidelines to the launch of FiTI, which took place in the same city. Ultimately the goal of the FiTI should be to ensure implementing countries adopt similar legislation to the Aarhus Convention, otherwise their commitment to transparency may be precarious and open to doubt.
A further issue with the FiTI lies with the implications of labelling countries as ‘compliant’ with the Standard. To some, this may be seen as an attractive dimension to the FiTI. As more countries sign up, others will be forced to follow suit, with the end result being a gradual improvement to transparency across more and more countries. A similar logic is used for other international voluntary initiatives, such as eco-labelling. Those fisheries that can demonstrate environmental credentials via voluntary certification schemes, are rewarded by more secure market access, meaning those that do not are forced to engage with these voluntary eco-labelling efforts if they wish to maintain their market access share or increase it.
The worry for those countries that decide not to engage with the FiTI is that this decision may be viewed negatively by others, and it could influence decisions on access to foreign donor funding, or even the negotiation of trade agreements. There may be genuine reasons why a country does not want to be part of the FiTI, such as lack of resources or simply that the country feels it s doing wellto improve civic engagement without the need of an international initiative. Indeed, at the launch of the FiTi Standard in Bali, the head of the Fisheries Forum Agency from the Pacific expressed doubt about the demand for the FiTI among its member states.
Moreover, achieving compliant status for the FiTI does not mean a country is more transparent than another who is not part of the initiative, in the same way obtaining an eco-label does not mean a fishery is better managed than one without. This is particularly true of the FiTI, as the decision to emphasise ‘progressive improvement’ means a country can, for a time, be compliant without publishing much information. Perhaps less information than another country that is not involved in the FiTI.
The dilemma here is that transparency is important, and there must be international pressure on countries to reform. Lack of transparency in the fisheries is a well recognized and widespread problem andprogress to improve this has been very slow in many countries. Public fisheries access agreements should not be entered in to with countries that manage fisheries in a highly opaque way, and it would be justified to favour investments in countries where fisheries is managed more openly. The FiTI provides a mechanism to help countries improve and communicate their commitment to responsible fisheries. However, achieving a ‘compliant’ status with the FiTI should not be taken at face value to mean a country is necessarily more transparent than others. More importantly, nor does it mean that the country is necessarily managing its fisheries in a responsible way. The FiTI does not provide this analysis.
The status of a country in the FiTI should therefore not be used to justify trade and investment decisions. Some of the countries involved in the initiative may hope that it does. This would be a source of concern, including for those countries that may have legitimate reasons to not engage with the initiative.
The FiTI provides a practical way of improving the availability and reliability of information on fisheries. The FiTi therefore fills an important gap in international fisheries reform efforts, as no other initiative exists that tackles the issue of transparency in a concerted way.
There are opportunities to use the data stemming from the FiTI to advance fisheries reforms efforts, and where appropriate to put pressure for increased accountability of national authorities and the private sector. A lot depends on how citizens and stakeholders respond to increased information provided as a result of the FiTI, and the extent to which participating countries embrace the ideal of “progressive improvements” and multi-stakeholder participation. The success of the FiTI in many contexts will therefore be influenced by resources and capacities of civil society organisations, fishing organisations and journalists to promote and engage in public debates and decision making processes. Ultimately the impact of the FiTi will be dependent on the willingness of those in positions of authority to listen and act on the recommendations from civil society and the fisheries sector. However, a threat to the credibility of the FiTI lies in the prospect of it being implemented in countries where governments continue to limit individual and media freedoms and genuine participation in decision making. The FiTI must not be allowed to provide such governments with a status of legitimacy.
The idea of the blue economy, presented on the international stage at Rio+20, has led to a surge in interest for achieving 'blue growth'. The idea of blue growth has led to different interpretations, including the EU's Blue Growth Strategy and the FAO's Blue Growth Initiative. For the small-scale sector these efforts to achieve blue growth offer both opportunities and risks. The policy implications need to be considered further so that small-scale fishers can play a proactive role in shaping blue growth reforms and investments.
Since 2010, the number of fishmeal factories in Mauritania has increased from 6 to 23, with most of these situated in the Northern port of Nouadhibou. Analysis of the fish being caught to supply these factories published in a recent paper provides a new insight into the regional migration of small-pelagic fish, casting some doubt on previous theories that have informed regional management advice. The government of Mauritania encouraged new investments in local fishmeal production in the belief this would target underexploited stocks of coastal species, with no overall impact on the availability of fish for direct human consumption. Yet there is now concern that the factories are relying on a different species, the round sardinella, which is a staple food in West Africa, but is now considered over-exploited by the FAO’s working group monitoring small-pelagic fish stocks in the region.
The EU's proposed Fishing Authorisation Regulation - or FAR, does not include transparency on beneficial ownership. This is disappointing, particularly given the EU's commitment to providing public access to information on beneficial ownership of all EU registered companies through its directive on anti-money laundering. Here CFFA argues that the EU's Fisheries Committee ought to include this aspect to the FAR, which would put the EU at the forefront of global efforts to address criminal and unethical behaviours in fisheries.
A significant proportion of EU funds used for Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements is earmarked for sectoral support - helping to develop sustainable fisheries in partner countries. However, analysis on the effectiveness of this sectoral support suggest considerable improvements are needed. Here we review the problems and offer our ideas on how the EU can make things better.
Since the new Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) entered into force on January 1st 2014, there have been improvements registered in Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements. However, tide still needs to turn as regards vessels fishing outside the framework of SFPAs.
Indeed, the EU external fleet counts around 700 vessels, but only 245 vessels fished under SFPAs in 2014: Several hundreds of EU vessels operate outside SFPAs, negotiating private agreements with third countries (this is only allowed when there is no SFPA between the EU and the particular country in place), or setting up chartering arrangements for their vessels with local businesses. Unfortunately, there is currently no way to have information about these arrangements.
This may change in the next months with a review of the so-called ‘Fishing Authorisation Regulation’ (FAR). This regulation will stipulate ‘eligibility criteria’, - designed to ensure transparency and sustainability- , that any EU vessel wanting to operate in external waters will have to fulfill to obtain a fishing authorisation from the EU Member State in which it is registered.
The proposal for a future FAR Regulation is currently being examined by the European Parliament and the Council. However, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), has already given its opinion on the matter. The EESC considers it necessary for the European Commission to verify the validity of the authorisations given by the Member State, checking whether the eligibility criteria have been duly applied.
In this article, CFFA explores why the European Commission should indeed verify what Member States do. Looking in particular at the case of Italy, we highlight that some EU countries tend to turn a blind eye to what their vessels are doing once they fish outside EU waters, thereby failing to fulfill their responsibilities as flag State under international law. Italy has consistently delivered fishing authorisations for all these vessels to fish in West Africa regardless of the fact that they shouldn’t be fishing there or that they were involved in illegal fishing.
This shows that if the EU is to ensure, through its Fishing Authorisation Regulation, that all its fishing vessels fishing outside EU waters respect “the same principles and standards as those applicable under Union law in the area of the CFP” as required by the new CFP, the European Commission has to play a key role to verify that all EU member states apply sustainability criteria rigorously before allowing their vessels to fish in third countries waters.
A new study commissioned by the African Union is intended to further our understanding on the costs of IUU fishing in Africa. This is important as existing claims about the scale and economic impact of IUU fishing are unreliable, and these are being used to call for increased resources for law enforcement and harsher treatment for criminals - without any consideration about the unintended consequences for workers and fishers. However, the methods used for this new study are limited, relying heavily on perceptions. More serious research is therefore needed to provide more balanced policy discussions.
On March 22d, the European Parliament Fisheries Committee discussed the new EU-Mauritania fishing agreement protocol. Most parliamentarians, like the rapporteur, Mr Mato, see positively the protocol proposed. However, the issue of the absence of a regional framework for the sustainable management of small pelagics was raised by Mrs Rodust, who insisted the EU should promote such regional management.
CFFA fully shares this point of view. With regard to access to small pelagic through the Mauritania – EU SFPA, our greatest concern in terms of sustainability remains the fact that access is allocated to foreign fleets, including those of the EU and Russia, in the absence of a necessary regional management framework for these species, shared between, mainly, Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. How is it possible to determine a surplus in the absence of such regional management?
The SRFC Convention on the Minimum Access Conditions (CMA), ratified by SRFC Member States, including Mauritania, call for a concerted management of small pelagic species in the region, and this call has been also made by local fishing communities, given the strategic importance of these resources for the food security of the entire region. This is a matter of urgency, given the state of full exploitation, or even over-exploitation of the round sardinella.
We therefore request the EU to make all possible efforts to promote such regional management, including through its SFPA dialogue with the concerned countries: Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal.
CFFA has additional comments about the EU-Mauritania new proposed protocol, concerning :
Mauritania commitment to Transparency
The Article 1 of the new Protocol stipulates that Mauritania undertakes to make public any public or private agreement allowing access to its EEZ by foreign vessels. This is an important positive step, which is rightly reflected by the rapporteur, Mr Mato. We hope that Mauritania will soon publish all these agreements, as it is for us a fundamental part of the implementation of the agreement, which will be examined at the occasion the first SFPA Joint Committee meeting, which will meet probably in May 2016.
Access to resources: by-catches of octopus and small pelagics
The state of the octopus resources in Mauritania remains a concern. The 2015-2019 Mauritania fisheries sector development strategy document insists on the fact that 'despite a recovery observed recently, the state of octopus stock is still a concern with overexploitation levels estimated to be at 17%’. In this context, it is to be welcome that there is no direct access for European fleets to this overexploited resource, which is key for the local artisanal sector.
However, if there is no access to the octopus as a target species through the SFPA, octopus remains one of species caught as bycatch: European shrimp trawlers may retain on board 8% of catches of cephalopods, composed mainly of octopus.
The rapporteur also underlines that Mauritania had undertaken to consider, during the first Joint Committee meeting, the possible allocation of new fishing opportunities for demersal freezer trawlers, which would then also include by-catches of octopus.
We feel that the impact of octopus by catches combined volumes on the state of the stock must be taken into account, and no further access should be given that would have a detrimental impact on the state of non-targeted resources, particularly the over exploited octopus.
The problem of bycatch is also present in the small pelagic fishery. For pelagic super trawlers, the joint Scientific Committee in 2013 made the hypothesis that there was possible under-reporting of by-catches, 'taking into account the practice of pelagic trawling which in general has a high bycatch rate with an important diversity of species caught as by-catch (over 100 species)'. The recent Maritime Atlas of vulnerable sea areas in Mauritania, published by the Mauritanian Institute of oceanographic research and fisheries (IMROP) states that, for the small pelagic fishery, 'while catches of the target species are well-regulated, the bycatch is a major problem’.
Efforts of selectivity are therefore needed to reduce by-catch of pelagic super trawlers, including by introducing, through the implementation of the 2015-2019 SFPA, the use of selectivity devices.
Sectoral support
During the last protocols, the sectoral support substantially decreased, from 16 million euros per year (2008-2012) to 3 million per year (2012-2014). It will be 4 million euros per year in the new protocol 2015-2019. So far, the use of sectoral support is very unsatisfactory for both parties: the funds were mainly used to cover running costs, rather than infrastructure, essential for the development of the sector. The question of transparency regarding the use of this sectoral support was also raised many times in the past.
To address these deficiencies, it is expected in the new protocol that sectoral support will be handled by an ‘execution cell’ that will coordinate the implementation with the beneficiaries of the selected projects. A report at the end of project will be published, which will consider the impact on resources, employment, investments. An annual workshop with beneficiaries will be held to present progress.
The rapid implementation of this transparent and participative approach should be encouraged, to improve the use of sectoral support funds to the benefits of Mauritanian sustainable fisheries development.
The conclusions drawn by the Court’s report need to be deepened and broadened, since they are based only on four agreements and mostly reflect the concerns of the EU ship owners. Little consideration is given by the Court to civil society and third countries fishing communities’ interests and needs.
Political rights need to be at the forefront of reform efforts in fisheries, although they are often forgotten. In this blog we explain why the Bali Guidelines, established in 2010 and based on Europe's Aarhus Convention, offer a powerful reference point for fisheries policy debates. However, very few organisations involved in fisheries seem to be aware of these guidelines and are therefore not involved in international efforts for their implementation. 2016 should be the year that changes.
Interview with Mrs Dienaba Beye Traoré, Head of Department for Harmonization of Policies and Legislations of the West Africa Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (SRCF)
Is the management of shared stocks, especially small pelagic species, an important issue for the SRFC?
The SRFC is an inter-governmental organization comprising seven Member States: Cabo Verde, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Mauritania, Senegal and Sierra Leone, and three associated States: Morocco, Liberia and Ghana. The annual fish production in the area covered by the SRFC exceeds 1.7 million tons of fish, worth an estimated 1.5 billion US dollars per year. Almost 77% of these landings are composed of small pelagics, which are not only the cornerstone of fish trade in West Africa, - it is estimated that one million tons are marketed in the region per year - but also represent, on average, 26% of the animal protein intake of the region populations. These stocks are strategic for the region, and the SRFC promotes their sustainable management.
This aspect was also addressed by the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) answers to SRFC questions concerning the responsibilities of States in the fight against IUU fishing and in the sustainable management of shared stocks...
The ITLOS opinion reaffirms that the Coastal State has the primary responsibility to combat IUU fishing in its EEZ. It is up to the coastal State to take the necessary measures to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, including boarding, inspection, seizure and judicial proceeding. It is also up to the coastal State to report to the flag State when its control over one of its vessels has not been exercised appropriately.
Regarding shared stocks, the ITLOS opinion also reaffirms that the SRFC Member States have the obligation to cooperate in order to take appropriate conservation and management measures to avoid that the shared resources are jeopardised by overexploitation.
It should be noted that the SRFC States are bound by the Convention on the Minimum Access Conditions[1] (CMAC). The CMAC stipulates (Article 9 paragraph 2) that ' Member States shall give priority to the establishment of concerted fisheries management plans for shared stocks'. Through this Convention, the SRFC Member States undertake also to ensure that conservation and management measures are based on the most reliable scientific data available, and, if such data are insufficient, to apply the precautionary principle. These principles also apply to the negotiation and signing of fisheries agreements.
What is the main problem encountered regarding fisheries agreements signed by the region’s countries?
I would say the lack of consultation amongst member States in the negotiations of the fisheries agreements. Each State prefers its sovereignty on the national maritime space, at the expense of dialogue with its neighbours.
Then, if we look at article 3 of the SRFC Convention on the Minimum Access Conditions, it states that the access of foreign fleets should be allowed only after consultation with the research institutions of the State concerned. However, these research centers, which are supposed to convince States about the need to cooperate, are not well equipped in terms of infrastructure: lack or insufficiency of research vessels, no or few laboratories, as well as very difficult working conditions for researchers...
The Convention also states that embarking observers and local crew is mandatory for vessels fishing shared stocks. But again, States face difficulties for the embarking of these two categories of professionals because vessels do not come to port in each country. The CMAC accordingly favors the negotiation of grouped agreements, which could help avoid this problem by putting on board an observer and sailors with a regional status. A revision of the CMAC is envisaged to provide for the possibility to negotiate and sign such grouped fisheries agreements.
CMAC promotes the harmonisation of management measures in SRFC Member States. What is SRFC’s work in this context?
In the SRFC region, national legislations must be harmonised with the CMAC on a series of elements, including mandatory embarkment of observers and crew from the region, management measures, including for artisanal fisheries (characterization, fishing authorisation and registration of pirogues requirements), etc. This is important also in relation to the implementation of the Port State measures for combating IUU fishing: there is a need to harmonise the classification of offences in the Member States, in drawing up the list of serious offences. Currently, the SRFC is conducting studies to compare SRFC members’ national legislations to the CCMA. In addition, two draft protocols are being prepared, one on the protection of the artisanal fishing communities and one on Marine Protected Areas.
[1] http://spcsrp.org/medias/csrp/publications/csrp_CMA_version_originale_juin_2012_english.pdf
